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Abstract
Under Florida law, the defense of intoxication can be asserted by an employer when his em-
ployee makes a claim for workmen’s compensation. Section 440.09(3) of the Florida Statutes deals
in pertinent part with the defense of intoxication wherein: ”No compensation shall be payable if
the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee..’
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Under Florida law, the defense of intoxication can be asserted by an
employer when his employee makes a claim for workmen's compensa-
tion. Section 440.09(3) of the Florida Statutes deals in pertinent part
with the defense of intoxication wherein: "No compensation shall be
payable if the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the
employee .. '.."I This statute, and the decisions interpreting it, stand
for the general proposition that, if an injury was caused primarily by
the claimant's intoxication and it can be shown that the intoxication was
the proximate cause of the injury, then recovery will be denied.2
In construing Section 440.09(3), Florida courts have been con-
cerned with the causal relationship of the claimant's conduct to the
injury.3 It is surprising to note, however, that the courts do not mention
the employer's possible culpability: "What if the employer gets the
employee drunk?" 4
To date, there have been no cases in Florida dealing with this
problem. This paper will explore the resolution of this issue in other
jurisdictions and apply existing Florida law to the analyses rendered.
1. SOLUTIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
In Tate v. Industrial Accident Commission,5 the California District
Court of Appeals, when confronted with a case where the employer
bought drinks for the claimant and then sent him home in a company
car, held:
I. § 440.09(3) FLA. STAT. (1977).
2. See, e.g., Zee v. Gary, 189 So. 34 (Fla. 1939), where the Florida Supreme
Court adopted the view that an injury caused by extreme intoxication of the employee
does not arise out of the employment.
3. See, e.g., Cone Brothers Contracting Co. v. Allbrook Co., 16 So. 2d 61 (Fla.
1943); Duval Engineering and Contracting Co. v. Johnson, 16 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1944).
4. L. M. ALPERT, FLORIDA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 19-12 at 493
(2nd ed. 1975).
5. 120 Cal. App. 2d 657, 261 P. 2d 759 (1st DCA 1953).
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Such a state of facts, if found to exist, would support a finding of estop-
pel. Such participation by the employer amounts to an implied represen-
tation that the employer will not hold it against the employee if he drinks,
and will not deprive him of his job or of compensation benefits if he
does so.'
Thus, the employer was prohibited from raising the intoxication of the
employee as a defense to the claim for benefits.
In the leading California case, McCarty v. Workmen's Compensa-
tion Appeals Board,' the employee's estate claimed death benefits for a
fatal injury which occurred when the worker was returning home from
a company-sponsored activity where the employer had permitted and
encouraged the consumption of alcoholic beverages. The California
Supreme Court, in overruling the Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board, held that the employer was estopped from asserting the defense
of employee intoxication since the facts demonstrated that the purchase
of intoxicants with company funds and the employer's active involve-
ment in the service of liquor at a company activity brought the em-
ployee's conduct within the scope of employment.'
The New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted an approach similar
to Tate in Henderson v. Sherwood Motor Hotel, Inc.9 There, the em-
ployee, a cocktail waitress, became intoxicated while on duty. The em-
ployer, aware of her condition, allowed her to leave work alone. In
upholding the employee's claim which arose out of an automobile acci-
dent on the way to her home, the court reasoned that, "[i]f the accident
resulted from her intoxication, her death could clearly be found to have
arisen 'out of' her employment."' 0 In reviewing the facts, the court
concluded that the employer, in effect, had directed the deceased em-
ployee to the location of the accident and contributed to her intoxicated
condition: "The fact that the accident was caused by the decedent's
intoxication is no bar to the action, since it was stated that 'the employer
knew that the employee was intoxicated.""'
6. 261 P. 2d at 764.
7. 12 Cal. 3d 677, 117 Cal. Rptr. 65, 527 P. 2d 617 (1974).
8. Id. at 684-85, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 69-70, 527 P. 2d at 622.
9. 201 A. 2d 891 (N.H. 1964).
10. Id. at 894. "The time bomb ... is started ticking during working hours, but
it happens to go off at a time and place remote from the employment. The hazards of
the employment follow the claimant beyond the time and space limits of his work and
there injure him." Id., citing 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 29.22 at
450.
11. 201 A. 2d at 894.
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In an important Indiana case, United States Steel Corporation v,
Mason," the employer allowed the claimant to operate a crane while
he was intoxicated. The Appellate Court found that, under those cir-
cumstances, an affirmative duty was placed on the employer by com-
mon law:
By no means do we excuse drinking or intoxication on the part of employ-
ees on any job, nor do we mean to contravene the statute that bars
recovery by employees who are intoxicated. What we are saying is that
when a violation is as evident and plain as in this case, the employer must
take some step to eliminate any semblance of approval or acquiescence.'
A review of existing case law shows that, in other jurisdictions,
when an employer allows or encourages his employee to become intoxi-
cated, such acquiescence bars him from raising intoxication as a defense
to a claim by the employee. This holds true even if the injuries are
sustained away from the employer's premises, once it can be shown that
the main activity of the worker was within the scope of his employment,
Le., a company function."
By comparison, in other states, this issue is encompassed within the
statutory framework. For example, Chapter 30, Section 61 of the Re-
vised Statutes of Maine provides:
No compensation or other benefits shall be allowed for the injury or death
of an employee where it is proved that . . . the same resulted from his
intoxication while on duty. This provision as to intoxication shall not
apply, if the employer knew that the employee was intoxicated or that
he was in the habit of becoming intoxicated while on duty. 5
Under this statute, if the claimant can show that the employer knew of
either specific intoxication or habitual drunkenness, he can prevent the
employer from raising the defense of intoxication. It is interesting to
note that Maine has carried the doctrine of employer responsibility set
forth in the common law one step further to cover the case of a worker
who has exhibited alcoholic dependency on previous occasions.
12. 227 N.E. 2d 684 (Ind. App. Ct. 1967).
13. Id. at 696.
14. See generally 47. A.L.R. 3d 566 (1973).
15. ME. REV. STAT. ch. 39, § 61 (1964) (emphasis added).
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2. DEVELOPING THE THEORY IN FLORIDA
Two of the basic postulates applied in other jurisdictions could also
be argued in Florida cases. First, the doctrine of estoppel', and second,
the scope of employment theory. 7
The application of the estoppel doctrine to workmen's' compensa-
tion cases is stated generally in Mercier v. American Refractories and
Crucible Corporation:"
[A]n employer may, by his conduct, estop himself from asserting what
under other circumstances would constitute a good defense to a claim for
consideration . . Estoppel involves the two elements of misleading con-
duct by one party and prejudicial harm resulting to the other party. 9
Unfortunately, use of the estoppel doctrine has been limited in
Florida compensation law to questions involving entitlement to compen-
sation. In Butler v. Allied Dairy Products,"0 the court held that an
employer and its insurance carrier, which had for several years provided
medical attention and treatment to an employee injured outside the
state, were estopped from disclaiming further liability for benefits on the
ground that the employment contract was not executed in Florida.',
Similarly, in Blair v. Edward J. Gerrits, Inc.,"2 the employee was
hired in Florida to do construction work in Puerto Rico and was injured
and hospitalized in Puerto Rico. When he left the hospital, his supervi-
sor purchased transportation for him to return to Florida, where he was
provided with medical treatment by the employer. The court, in holding
that the employer was estopped from insisting that the claimant return
to Puerto Rico for medical treatment and compensation, said, "[t~he
employer-carrier may not now be allowed to say there is no coverage
in Florida when their prior conduct logically led the Petitioner to believe
16. See text accompanying notes 5 and 6 supra.
17. See text accompanying notes 7 through II supra.
18. 200 A. 2d 716 (Conn. 1964).
19. Id. at 720.
20. 151 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1963).
21. Id. at 283. The Florida Workmen's Compensation statute provides that, if the
employment contract is executed in Florida, an employee who is injured outside of the
state is entitled to compensation. Id. at 281. The court pointed out that the gist of the
statute is not whether the Industrial Relations Commission has jurisdiction over the
subject matter, but whether the claimant is entitled to benefits. Id. at 283.
22. 193 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1966).
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that he could expect and receive coverage here."'
Therefore, since the doctrine of estoppel is utilized in other areas
of Florida compensation law, it might also be employed to bar the
defense of employee intoxication. The two elements for estoppel enunci-
ated in Mercier"4 would be satisfied by showing: 1) misleading con-
duct by one party - the employer's acquiescence in or encouragement
of the employee's intoxication; and 2) prejudicial harm resulting to the
other party - the employee's loss of compensation benefits.,
The more fruitful approach to this issue may be found within the
framework of "scope of employment.""6 If it can be shown that em-
ployee drinking is within that "scope," the employer may be held liable
for claims arising out of injuries proximately caused by the intoxication.
The general test for connection to work is stated succinctly as
follows:
A compensable injury must arise not only within the time and space limits
of the employment, but also in the course of an activity related to the
employment. An activity is related to the employment if it carries out the
employer's purposes or advances his interests directly or indirectly.
Under the modern trend of decisions, even if the activity cannot be said
in any sense to advance the employer's interests, it may still be in the
course of employment if, in view of the nature of the employment envi-
ronment, the characteristics of human nature, and the customs or prac-
tices of the particular employment, the activity is in fact an inherent part
of the conditions of that employment."
In Florida, this doctrine has been codified at Section 440.02(6) of the
Florida Statutes, which defines "injury" as "personal injury or death by
accident arising out of and in the course of employment. . . ."2 Fol-
lowing the enactment of this statute, the Florida Supreme Court was
23. Id. at 175. The parties agreed that, since the contract was for employment
exclusively out of state, the claimant would otherwise have been barred from recovery.
But see Wainright v. Wainright, Inc., 237 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1970) (citing Butler and Blair,
but holding that there was no waiver or estoppel in this particular case).
24. 200 A. 2d 716.
25. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
26. This doctrine, concerned with causal connection, holds that an employee's
injuries would be compensable if he could show that the injuries would not have hap-
pened but for the conditions of the employment. See generally I LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Ch. III (1978).
27. LARSON, supra note 26, § 20.00 at 5-I.
28. § 440.02(6) FLA. STAT. (1978).
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confronted with an employee intoxication case in Johnson v. Koffee
Kettle Restaurant,9 where the employee was killed while walking across
the highway from his place of employment, a restaurant, to obtain
supplies from the grocery store across the street. His breath was found
to contain an odor of alcoholic beverage. Nevertheless, the court al-
lowed recovery."
In another Florida intoxication case, Maroney v. Kelly and Sons,
Inc.,31 the claimant was entrusted with the employer's truck. After he
completed a business mission, he drank beer with a fellow employee. He
then realized that he had forgotten certain documents and decided to
return to the place where he had left them. While en route, he was
injured. The court denied compensation, applying the deviation from
employment doctrine, 2 without commenting on the intoxication issue
or the employer's knowledge of the employee's drinking.33
Florida courts have been confronted with various cases involving
the liabilityof employers for injuries sustained by employees who fol-
lowed their employers' directions. For example, in Taylor v. Dixie Ply-
wood Company,34 the court awarded compensation to an employee
who was injured in an automobile accident on the way to his doctor's
office, after being directed by his employer to seek medical attention for
a job-related injury which occurred earlier that day. Similarly, in Heller
Brothers Packing Company v. Lewis, 5 the Florida Supreme Court
based its ruling for the claimant on the rationale that, when the em-
ployer "directed" the employee to take the company jeep and obtain
29. 125 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1960).
30. In allowing recovery, the following test was applied:
[Ilt is essential that claimant prove or show a state of facts from which it may be
reasonably inferred that deceased was engaged in his master's business when the
accident resulting in his injury took place. If the evidence to establish such a state
of facts is competent and substantial and comports with reason or from which it
may be reasonably inferred that deceased was engaged in his master's business
when he was injured, it is sufficient.
Id. at 299. It is interesting to note that the defense of employee intoxication was not
mentioned by the court.
31. 195 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1967).
32. This doctrine holds that an employee who deviates from his employment
duties in order to conduct personal business is not entitled to compensation for injuries
sustained before he returns to those duties. See Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York
v. Moore, 196 So. 495 (Fla. 1940).
33. 195 So. 2d at 209-10.
34. 297 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1974).
35. 20 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1945).
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol3/iss1/13
Workmen's Compensation: Employee Intoxication
lunch (at which time he was injured), the employer was advancing his
own interests.-
Similar holdings may be found in cases where the employer sup-
plies transportation for the employee. In Huddock v. Grant Motor
Company,"' the Florida Supreme Court found that injuries sustained
by an employee who is provided with transportation by the employer
are compensable when that arrangement is:
the result of an express or implied agreement between the employer and
his workman or when it has ripened into a custom to the extent that it is
incidental to and part of the contract of employment, or when it is with
the knowledge and acquiescence of the employer, or when it is the result
of a continued practice in the course of the employer's business, and
which practice is beneficial to both the employer and the employee.,
This theory, by analogy, could be applied to the issue under discus-
sion. If the employee could show that the employer provided him with
the opportunity to become intoxicated, acquiesced in or encouraged his
drinking, the employee could argue that his resulting behavior should
be considered within the scope of employment. Therefore, any resulting
injury would be compensable, despite an assertion by the employer that
the defense of employee intoxication would defeat the claim.
A more restrictive approach has been taken in the area of recrea-
tion than in other employer-supplied activities. For example, in Mathias
v. City of South Daytona,"8 the Florida Supreme Court denied a peti-
tion for writ of certiorari to review the order of the Industrial Relations
Commission denying benefits to a police officer who was injured at a
36. Id. at 387. The court recognized the general principle that there is no liability
when an injury occurs during lunchtime and away from the employer's premises, even
though the employee may be riding in the employer's vehicle, "on the theory that the
accident did not arise out of or in the course of the employment." Id. at 387. Neverthe-
less, it upheld the award for compensation, stating:
The foreman well knew that a hungry fruit picker could not render very efficient
services and a lunch would enhance the interest of both the employer and em-
ployee in that food would create the strength and reserve of the employee to work,
thereby resulting in more efficient services in gathering fruit in behalf of the
employer. The interest of the employer was advanced by the foreman in directing
the employee to take the [employer's] "jeep" and go to . . . obtain lunch.
Id.
37. 228 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1969).
38. Id. at 900.
39. 350 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1977).
I! :17
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softball game held at his employer's home. Although at the administra-
tive hearing the Judge of Industrial Claims awarded compensation,
having found that the function fell within the scope of employment and
that pressure was brought on the employee to attend, the claim for
compensation was rejected by the Commission." Justice Sundberg, in
a dissenting opinion, argued that, in light of the general rules enunciated
in Larson,4 the view adopted in Florida is conservative and self-
defeating. 2 Recreational activities are defined as being within the course
of employment when:
1. They occur on the premises during a lunch or recreation period as a
regular incident of the employment; or
2. The employer, by expressly or impliedly requiring participation, or
by making the activity part of the services of an employee, brings the
activity within the orbit of the employment; or
3. The employer derives substantial direct benefit from the activity be-
yond the intangible value of improvement in employee health and morale
that is common to all kinds of recreation and social life.
43
While these criteria could be applied in intoxication cases by draw-
ing an analogy to employer-sponsored recreational activities, the em-
ployer may claim that, since drinking is beneficial primarily to the
employee, the claimant's attempt to prohibit the employer from raising
the intoxication defense should be defeated. In response, the claimant
could argue that an employee who becomes intoxicated while engaged
in business-related activities is serving both a personal and a business
purpose and should be compensated for resulting injuries under the
"dual purpose doctrine." 4
40. Id. at 458.
41. Supra note 26.
42. 350 So. 2d at 459-60 (Sundberg, J. dissenting). For a more enlightening
approach, see Tedesco v. General Electric Co., 305 N.Y. 544, 114 N.E. 2d 33 (Ct. App.
1953) (holding that, under the facts of the case, injuries sustained during a softball game
were compensable as arising out of the course of employment).
43. LARSON, supra note 26, § 22.21 at 5-71.
44. The "dual purpose doctrine" is stated in Krause v. West Lumber Co., 227
So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1969), where the Florida Supreme Court upheld a claim for injuries
suffered in a car accident by the employee who was on the way to an employer-
sponsored sales meeting. The employer had directed the employee to take the em-
ployee's own automobile for the trip. "The fact that claimant's personal convenience
was being served, as well as the interest of the employer, does not preclude recovery.
An employee whose activities are serving a personal and business purpose is within the
8
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3. CONCLUSION
The question of employer encouragement with respect to the de-
fense of employee intoxication is unanswered in Florida, although other
jurisdictions resolve the issue through case law or statute. Nevertheless,
through the application of the doctrine of estoppel, as well as argument
by analogy to scope of employment situations where the employer either
directs, encourages or allows certain employee conduct, the Florida
claimant has legal authority to prevent the employer from successfully
raising the defense.
However, the employer can limit the effectiveness of the claimant's
position by asserting that, since drinking is solely in the employee's
beneficial interest, any claim for workmen's compensation benefits for
injuries to an intoxicated employee should be denied. Although the
Florida Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this issue, its reluctance in
some areas, e.g., recreation, to disturb holdings of lower courts which
upheld the defense of employee intoxication suggests that the Florida
claimant will have difficulty in successfully pursuing a claim for work-
men's compensation when his intoxication is caused, even in part, by
actions of his employer.
Myrna L. Black
scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act." Id. at 488 (emphasis added). See also
Zipperer v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1970).
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